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STATE v. VIOLETTE: HARSHER
RESENTENCING ENCOUNTERS A
BOLDER PRESUMPTION OF
VINDICTIVENESS
Twenty-one years ago in Weeks v. State,' the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, adopted a rule to prevent
judicial vindictiveness when resentencing defendants who had successfully appealed their conviction and been reconvicted. The
Weeks court adopted as a state due process protection the United
States Supreme Court's rule laid down the preceding year in North
Carolina v. Pearce.2 The Pearce rule provides that harsher resentencing of such defendants creates a presumption of constitutionally
prohibited vindictiveness unless the harsher sentence is explicitly
based on some identifiable misconduct by the defendant since the
prior sentencing.3 Thus, the Law Court recognized under Maine's
due process guarantee' exactly the same resentencing protection described in Pearce under the federal due process guarantee.'
The Pearce rule created a presumption of vindictiveness that
seemingly arose whenever a harsher sentence was given, but the rule
proved more complicated to apply than the language in Pearcesuggested. The Supreme Court has since explained and narrowed the
rule. Specifically, the Supreme Court in revising Pearce has required
a likelihood of vindictiveness before applying the presumption and
has recognized broader ground for rebutting the presumption.'
Until this year, the few cases giving the Law Court the opportunity to apply Weeks revealed no detectable differences between
Maine's due process protection and the federal due process protection under Pearce.The Law Court's recent decision in State v. Violette,7 however, raises a question whether the Weeks rule and the
revised Pearce rule coincide.
In Violette, the defendant, after an appeal and upon a reconviction, received a harsher sentence from a judge who expressly noted
that he was unaware of the initial sentence.8 Unlike the Supreme
1. 267 A.2d 641 (Me. 1970).
2. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
3. Id. at 726.

4. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor be denied the equal protection of the lam, nor be denied the enjoyment of
his civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof." ML CoNsM. art. I.
§ 6-A.
5. "We therefore adopt for the courts of this State the constitutional guidelines of
Pearce." 267 A.2d at 647.

6. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
7. 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990).
8.

Id. at 1360.
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Court in recent applications of Pearce, the Law Court in Violette
applied the presumption of vindictiveness without weighing the likelihood of vindictiveness. 9 The Law Court ruled in a 5-1 decision that
the Weeks rule prevented a sentence harsher than the initial sentence despite the resentencing judge's lack of knowledge of the initial sentence. 0
The significance of Violette is unclear because of the competing
tones in the Law Court's decision and because there are no Supreme
Court cases procedurally on point with Violette. Possibly, the Law
Court hesitated in Violette to try to mirror a revised Pearce rule
when operating in unexplored procedural waters. A bolder interpretation of Violette is that the Law Court declined to take notice of
the Supreme Court's emaciation of the Pearce rule and has begun a
process of distinguishing the state due process protection from federal due process. In addition, the Law Court raised the issue of sentencing disparity in Violette in noting that the two sentencing
judges sentenced the same defendant differently using the same
facts." Thus, the Law Court may have been motivated in ruling as it
did by a desire for sentencing consistency.
This Note will track the erosion of the Pearce rule, compare the
pillars of Violette to the principal federal revisions of Pearce, and
draw upon the language and context of Violette to explore the Law
Court's motivation and the future of the Weeks rule. This Note
credits the Law Court for the simplicity of its approach in Violette,
but suggests that a state due process protection exceeding the federal due process protection will require the Law Court to functionally define identifiable misconduct or "recidivism" 1 2 and to readdress Weeks in the context of plea bargaining, as the Supreme Court
has done with Pearce.
BACKGROUND

North Carolina v. Pearce3 began as a federal habeas corpus proceeding involving a state prisoner. The defendant successfully appealed but was retried, reconvicted and resentenced to a longer
term. This sentence was vacated in a federal habeas corpus action,
9. Id. at 1360-61.
10. Id. at 1361.
11. Id. at 1360-61.
12. The Law Court uses "recidivism" and "identifiable misconduct" interchangeably in Violette as justification for harsher resentencing under the due process rule it
adopted. Id. at 1360.
13. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Simpson v.Rice, a companion case, reported with Pearce,
also began as a habeas corpus proceeding. The defendant, an Alabama prisoner, suc-

cessfully withdrew from a guilty plea, was tried and convicted, and was resentenced
more harshly without receiving credit for the time he had spent in prison on the
original judgments. Id. at 714. Insofar as the imposition of a harsher sentence, Simpson was overturned by the Supreme Court in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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and North Carolina sought the Supreme Court's review."
The Pearce Court said that any judicial vindictiveness against a
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction would
violate due process under the fourteenth amendment,", Although
there is no absolute constitutional bar against harsher resentencing
of a defendant upon reconviction,' 6 a harsher resentencing creates in
effect a presumption of vindictiveness in violation of due process.1 7
The Pearce Court created this presumption to protect against actual
vindictiveness and to free defendants of apprehension of
retaliation."s
The Pearce Court crafted specific requirements to rebut the presumption. To ensure the absence of a vindictive motivation in resentencing, a judge imposing a harsher sentence must base his reasons
on "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."' 9 The reasons must "affirmatively appear," and
the facts upon which the harsher sentence is based must be put into
the record.2 0
The Law Court adopted the constitutional guidelines of Pearce as
a due process protection under the Maine Constitution in Weeks u.
State.2 The Weeks court recognized it was adopting an "inflexible
rule" with "built-in protection" against vindictiveness in resentenc22
ing.

The court also acknowledged the chilling effect that a possible

14. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713-14.
15. Id. at 725. The Pearce Court appeared to go further in the rule's applicability
than subsequent decisions. Pearce seemed to be concerned with removing the chilling
effect from the fear of possible vindictiveness felt by defendants exercising their right
to appeal. The Pearce Court stated, "And since the fear of such vindictiveness may
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally
attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." Id.
(emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court shortly afterwards signaled that the
Pearce rule was not about apprehension but was about presumption based on some
likelihood of vindictiveness. An unfortunate attorney in Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S.
319 (1970), relying on Pearce to overturn a harsher sentence in a reconviction, lost his
case when he told the Supreme Court in oral argument, "I have never contended that
Judge Pugh was vindictive," thereby rebutting any presumption. The Court noted in
its three-page opinion that the counsel's statement was dispositive. Id. at 320.
16. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723. The Supreme Court in Pearce dismissed any violation of double jeopardy or equal protection violations of the fourteenth amendment by harsher resentencing after a successful appeal and a reconviction. Id.
17. Id. at 726.
18. Id. at 725.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 267 A.2d 641, 646-47 (1970).
22. Id. at 647. While the Law Court adopted the Pearce constitutional guidelines
as part of state due process, it rejected an absolute bar against the passing of heavier
sentences on reconviction and resentencing because of the public interest in basing
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harsher sentence could have on a defendant's desire to have "an illegal sentence or an erroneously conducted trial" corrected.23 The
Weeks rule appeared to be the mirror image of the Pearce rule.
Due to the complexities inherent in the judicial process and the
latitude generally given trial courts in sentencing, 24 the Pearce decision did not end disparities among the state courts and the lower
federal courts as to when harsher sentencing is permissible upon a
reconviction. 25 The confusion has presented the Supreme Court with

opportunities to readdress the Pearce decision, and the Court has
responded by restricting the rule much more than the Pearce decision conceivably allowed.
The Supreme Court has narrowed the circumstances under which
the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness is evoked. In Colten v.
Kentucky,2" the Supreme Court declined to apply the presumption
of vindictiveness when the defendant received a more severe sentence in a de novo trial than in his trial in an inferior court.2 7 The
Court said the possibility of vindictiveness is not inherent in a twotiered court system and concluded that defendants would not be
"deterred from seeking a second trial out of fear of judicial vindictiveness."2 In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 29 a case involving sentencing
by two juries, the Supreme Court held that the presumption did not
apply where a jury unknowingly imposed a harsher sentence on resentencing on "the most complete and current information available at the time of
sentencing." Id.
23. Id.
24. Sentencing should take into account "information concerning every aspect of a
defendant's life." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949). Williams was cited
by the Supreme Court in Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 572 (1984), as providing the underlying philosophy of modern sentencing. Congress, however, changed
the federal sentencing approach in 1987 by legislating federal sentencing guidelines.
See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the development of the federal
sentencing guidelines, see Ogletree, The Death of Discretion?Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1938 (1988).
25. See Comment, Limits on Enhanced Sentences Following Appeal and Retrial:
Has Pearce Been Pierced?, 19 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1987).
26. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
27. Colten was convicted of disorderly conduct in the Quarterly Court of Fayette
County, Kentucky, and fined $10. Colten exercised his right to a trial de novo in the
Criminal Division of the Fayette Circuit Court and was convicted again and fined
$50. Neither trial was before a jury. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 107-108.
28. Id. at 116. The Supreme Court found no basis to presume a possibility of
vindictiveness where the trial court was not "asked to do over what it thought it had
already done correctly." Id. at 116-17. The majority did not equate the de novo trial
with a retrial after an appeal, but Justice Marshall, in dissent, disputed the point and
said the danger of vindictiveness is exactly the same in both situations. Id. at 122-27
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). The defendant was convicted of robbery by open force or
violence and sentenced by the jury. He successfully appealed and was retried, reconvicted and resentenced with a different judge and jury. Id. at 18-20.
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trial than did the prior sentencer. The Supreme Court said that a
minimal potential for abuse of the sentencing process by a
jury exists in a properly controlled retrial.3 0 First, the jury does not know
the prior sentence. Second, the jury has no personal stake in the
prior conviction and no motive for self-vindication. Finally, the jury
is unlikely to be sensitive to institutional interests that might be an
incentive to discourage meritless appeals.31 Through Colten and
Chaffin, the Court limited the application of the Pearce presumption only to those cases in which a realistic likelihood 2 of vindictiveness exists. Consequently, application of the Pearce rule now requires some assessment of the likelihood of vindictiveness.ss
A decade later, the Supreme Court further clarified this more flexible application of the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness and, as
importantly, widened the state's opportunity to rebut the presumption. In Wasman u. United States,53 a defendant who had successfully appealed his conviction for willfully making false statements in
a passport application was reconvicted before the same judge and
sentenced more harshly than upon the original conviction. In upholding the harsher sentence, the Supreme Court said Pearce was
only intended to bar harsher sentencing motivated by "actual vindictiveness" for having exercised constitutional rights.3- 1Thus, either
the situation must warrant a presumption of vindictiveness, or the
defendant, without benefit of the presumption, must prove actual
vindictiveness.3 6
The Supreme Court applied the presumption in Wasman but said
the presumption was rebutted. The trial judge based the harsher
sentence on the existence of a conviction that had been only a pend30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 26-27.
32. The language, "realistic likelihood," is later used in referring to Colten and

Chaffin in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). See infra note 33. Subsequently, in United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982), and in Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the Supreme Court used the language. "reasonable likeli-

hood," in discussing the possibility of vindictiveness.
33. The Court was explicit in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 27, that a realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness was required to elicit the Pearce rule. "The lesson that
emerges from Pearce, Colten, and Chaffin is that the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only
by those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.'" Id. Blackledge involved
an allegation of prosecutorial vindictiveness directed at a North Carolina prison inmate who chose to appeal a misdemeanor conviction of assault with a deadly weapon.
While the appeal was pending, the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment covering
the same conduct for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict
serious bodily injury. The defendant pleaded guilty but applied for a federal writ of
habeas corpus claiming a violation of due process. The writ was granted, and both the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
34. 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
35. Id. at 568.
36. Id. at 569.
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ing charge at the original sentencing. 37 The Supreme Court said it
could not logically distinguish between "events," in this case the
conviction on a pending charge, and misconduct subsequent to the
prior sentencing as a justification for harsher resentencing. The
Wasman Court concluded that either is an adequate rebuttal for a
presumption of vindictiveness."8 Following Wasman, the scope of information that the state might use to rebut the presumption was no
longer limited to factors primarily in the control of the defendant
but could include events with roots preceding the initial sentencing.
The grounds for not applying the Pearce presumption were widened in Texas v. McCullough. 9 The defendant, whose conviction
was overturned on appeal and who was reconvicted, received a harsher resentence from a judge who had heard evidence not before the
sentencing jury in the first trial. The judge said the testimony of two
new witnesses directly affected the strength of the state's case as to
both guilt and punishment. In addition, the judge learned on retrial
that the defendant had been released from prison only four months
before committing the crime. 40 The McCullough Court found the
Pearce presumption "inappropriate" when "there was no realistic
41
motive for vindictive sentencing" under the facts of the case.
The Supreme Court articulated three bases for Pearce not applying in McCullough.42 First, the possibility of vindictiveness was
speculative because the judge herself had granted the new trial in
this instance.43 Second, different sentencers were involved." Third,
the sentencer provided "an on-the-record, wholly logical, nonvindictive reason" for the harsher sentence."
37. Id. at 561-62. The defendant originally was sentenced to two years' imprisonment with all but six months suspended. Prior to his reconviction, he pleaded noto
contendere to a charge pending at the time of his first sentencing. Upon his reconviction, the judge sentenced the defendant to two years' imprisonment, none of it suspended. Id. The trial judge clearly explained in the record the basis for the harsher
sentence: "I did not consider then [at the original sentencing] and I don't in other
cases either, pending matters because that would result in a pyramiding of sentences.
At this time he comes before me with two convictions. Last time, he came before me
with one conviction." Id. at 569.
38. Id. at 571-72.
39. 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
40. The defendant, convicted of murder, received a sentence from the jury of 20

years' imprisonment. After a successful appeal and a reconviction by a new jury
before the same trial judge, the defendant elected to have the judge sentence him.
The judge sentenced him to 50 years' imprisonment. Id. at 136.

41. Id. at 139.
42.

The Supreme Court noted in McCullough that "Pearce itself apparently in-

volved different judges presiding over the two trials." However, the Court said the
Pearce Court did not focus on that fact, leading to the conclusion that Pearce did not
speak on the issue of separate sentencers. Id. at 140 n.3.

43. Id. at 138-39.
44. Id. at 140.
45. Id.
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The basis for not applying the Pearce presumption also was widened in Alabama v. Smith,6 in which a defendant successfully withdrew his plea bargain on appeal but was reconvicted and sentenced
by the same judge to a longer term. The trial judge said the harsher
sentence was based on "new information about the nature of [the]
crimes and their impact on the victim, together with... observations of [the defendant's] 'mental outlook on [the offenses] and [his]
position during the trial.' "'4 In upholding the longer sentence, the
Supreme Court said that the trial judge may have "a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crimes charged" after a trial,
that the factors justifying "leniency as consideration for the guilty
plea are no longer present," and that "the court is not simply
'do[ing] over what it thought it had already done correctly.' "48 The
Smith Court concluded that the Pearce presumption should not apply where "it cannot be said to be more likely than not that a judge
0
who imposes [a harsher sentence] is motived by vindictiveness.'
The opportunities for the Law Court to interpret Pearce and
Weeks have been more limited. The Law Court implicitly weighed
the likelihood of vindictiveness in declining to apply the Weeks presumption of vindictiveness in State v. Keegan.50 The defendant received a harsher sentence after a de novo jury trial in superior
court" than he received as a result of a district court trial. 2 The
Law Court, citing Colten,53 upheld the sentence. The Keegan court
found no basis for distinguishing between Maine's two-tiered court
system at that time and the Kentucky system examined by the Supreme Court in Colten, and it held there was no state or federal due
process violation."
In two other cases preceding Violette, however, the Law Court relied on Pearce, as adopted by Weeks, 5 to remand cases for resen56
tencing. In State v. Sutherburg,
in which a defendant suffered a
46. 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
47. Id. at 797.
48. Id. at 801 (quoting in part Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972)).
49. Id. at 802.
50. 296 A.2d 483 (Me. 1972).
51. Until January 1, 1982, a defendant convicted in district court had a right to
receive a trial de novo in superior court. M.D.C. Cimi. 1. 37(a), 38, 39(b), 40. After

that date, a defendant could appeal to the superior court for review only of questions
of law. MR. CmL P. 36(b).
52. The defendant received a sentence of 30 days in the county jail upon his conviction for assault and battery in district court On a conviction for assault by a superior court jury, he was sentenced to 60 days. State v. Keegan, 296 A.2d at 484.
53. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
54. 296 A.2d at 486.
55. The Law Court, for no detectable reason, referred in some decisions to Pearce
instead of Weeks despite having adopted in Weeks the Pearce guidelines.
56. 402 A.2d 1294 (Me. 1979). The defendant was fined $150 upon a conviction in
district court for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol After

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:523

larger fine following a superior court conviction than was imposed in
district court, the Law Court found the judge's justification that the
defendant should reimburse the state for "the needless expense that
the State was put to" for a jury trial constituted vindictiveness in
violation of federal due process. 57 In State v. Palmer,"s the Law
Court found that the judge in resentencing more harshly had violated the Weeks standard by failing to state an objective reason
based on identifiable conduct by the defendant since the original
sentencing. 59
The Law Court in State v. Keefe,6 0 however, decided that neither
Weeks nor Palmer precluded a harsher sentence on a single count in
resentencing if the aggregate sentence had not been enhanced.0 ' The
Law Court said the defendant lost nothing by his appeal; he only
failed to realize a net gain. The case nevertheless was remanded for
resentencing because of other difficulties.6 2
THE STUDY CASE

In Violette, the defendant was tried without counsel63 and was
convicted by a district court for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol (OUI).6 4 Violette was fined and sena conviction by a superior court jury in a de novo trial, the judge fined the defendant
$750. Id. at 1295.
57. Id. at 1296.
58. 468 A.2d 985 (Me. 1983).
59. Id. at 988-89. With consecutive sentences and suspension of a two-year sentence, the defendant under the original sentencing would have served six months in
jail and made restitution payments to the victims of $3,564. After the reviewing justice found the sentence in violation of state law, the original trial judge resentenced
the defendant to two years' imprisonment and the same restitution. The judge said
he had previously suspended part of the defendant's sentence only to help insure
restitution and was not imposing a more severe sentence out of retaliation. Id. at 98687.
60. 573 A.2d 20 (Me. 1990). The defendant was originally convicted on six counts,
including counts of aggravated assault and attempted murder. The sentence on the
count of aggravated assault was four years' imprisonment with no probation. The
defendant successfully appealed the attempted murder conviction. On remand for resentencing, the defendant's original sentence on the count of aggravated assault was
increased to eight years with all but four years suspended and four years probation.
Id. at 21.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 22.
63. Record at 3 (Feb. 5, 1988), State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No.
87-18834, 87-18835, 87-18769).
64. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312-B (Supp. 1990). The statute reads in part:
1. Offense. A person is guilty of a criminal violation under this section if
he operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle:
A. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or a
combination of liquor and drugs; or
B. While having 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in
his blood.
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tenced, as requested by the prosecutor," to a sentence of sixty days
in jail, with all but thirty days suspended, and nine months probation with other conditions. After a successful appeal, he was reconvicted in district court.6 The same prosecutor made the same sentencing request." The judge, who did not participate in the original
trial and did not know the prior sentence imposed,"8 fined and sentenced the defendant to six months in jail, with all but forty-five
days suspended, and one year probation with other conditions.c5
The trial judge considered in the resentencing that the conviction
was the defendant's third offense and that the defendant had fled
from the arresting officer.7 0 Those factors, however, were known to
the court at the original sentencing.7 ' The defendant appealed the
sentence to superior court, which vacated the sentence as a violation
of state due process and remanded for resentencing." On appeal by
the state, the Law Court affirmed. 3
The state argued that in the absence of any basis to presume vindictiveness and of any proof of actual vindictiveness, and where the
resentencing judge provided a logical, nonvindictive reason on the
record for the sentence,7 4 no basis existed to view the judge's harsher sentence on the defendant's reconviction as a violation of the
defendant's right to due process. The state emphasized that the
judge had no prior knowledge of the first sentence and that he instructed the defense that he did not wish to be informed of it so
that the resentencing would be totally without reference to the previous sentence.7 5 The state urged the Law Court to adopt the federal
interpretations of Pearce, narrowing the circumstances in which the
presumption of vindictiveness must be applied to ensure due process.7 The state drew upon Chaffin,7 in which the Supreme Court
found no presumption of vindictiveness when the sentencing jury
65. Record at 48 (Feb. 5, 1988), State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No.
87-18834, 87-18835, 87-18769).
66. State v. Violette, 576 A.2d at 1359.
67. Record at 43 (May 19, 1989), State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No.
87-18834).
68. Id. at 44.
69. Id. at 45-46.
70. Id. at 45.
71. Record at 15, 26 and 48 (Feb. 5, 1988), State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me.
1990) (No. 87-18834, 87-18835, 87-18769). Record at 9, 13 and 43 (May 19, 1989),
State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No. 87-18834).
72. State v. Violette, 576 A.2d at 1360.
73. Id. at 1361.
74. Brief for Appellant, State of Maine, at 12-14, State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359
(Me. 1990) (No. YOR-90-63).
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
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was not informed of the prior sentence by another jury,78 and McCullough,79 in which no presumption was applied because different
sentencers gave the sentences.8 0
The defendant emphasized the prerogative of the Law Court to
depart from the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal due process when interpreting state due process"' and showed legislative
sentiment against increases in sentences on review.8 2 Finally, the defendant reminded the Law Court of the chilling effect of possible
vindictiveness on the defendant's exercise of the constitutional right
of appeal.8 "
In an amicus curiae brief, the Maine Civil Liberties Union
(MCLU) asked the Law Court to affirm the Superior Court's remand for sentencing on the basis that the higher sentence was not
justified by the defendant's behavior since the prior sentence. According to the MCLU, it was immaterial that the judge gave a logical, nonvindictive reason for a harsher sentence and was unaware of
the prior sentence.8 4 The MCLU emphasized the possible role that
fear of vindictiveness would have in discouraging appeals and the
institutional interests that create the risk of vindictiveness even
when the sentencing is by different judges.85
The MCLU attempted to distinguish Violette from Supreme
78. Brief for Appellant, State of Maine, at 10-11, State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359
(Me. 1990) (No. YOR-90-63).
79. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
80. Brief for Appellant, State of Maine, at 11-12, State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359
(Me. 1990) (No. YOR-90-63).
81. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No.
YOR-90-63).
82. The defendant cited ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2156 (1)(A), (B) (Supp.
1990) forbidding the increase of sentences on review. Brief for Appellee at 8, State v.
Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No. YOR-90-63). The text of the statute reads in
part:
1. Substitution of sentence or remand. If the Supreme Judicial Court
determines that relief should be granted, it may:
A. Substitute for the sentence under review any other disposition that was open to the sentencing court, provided however,
that the sentence substituted shall not be more severe than the
sentence appealed; or
B. Remand the case to the court that imposed the sentence for
any further proceedings that could have been conducted prior to
the imposition of the sentence under review and for resentencing
on the basis of such further proceedings, provided however, that
the sentence shall not be more severe than the sentence originally
imposed.
83. Brief for Appellee at 10, State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No.
YOR-90-63).
84. Brief of Amicus Curiae Maine Civil Liberties Union at 5-6, State v. Violette,
576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No. YOR-90-63).
85. Id. at 7-8.
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Court decisions on procedural bases.80 The defendant in Violette
was sentenced and resentenced by different judges in the same
court. The harsher resentence in Colten v. Kentucky" was in a trial
de novo. Chaffin v.Stynchcombe 88 involved sentencing and resentencing by different juries. Further, the MCLU distinguished
United States v. Goodwin,89 by noting that the case involved a prosecutor's pretrial decision to file increased charges. In Texas o. McCullough, 0 the judge resentenced more harshly than a jury initially
had sentenced. Finally, in Alabama v. Smith,91 the defendant's initial sentence had been plea bargained. None of these cases involved
sentencing by two judges in the same court.
The Law Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice McKusick,
affirmed in Violette the superior court's decision vacating the sentence and remanding the case for resentencing. Using the primacy
method92 of state constitutional decision-making embraced in State
v. Cadman,93 the Law Court looked first to the state constitution to
resolve the due process issue. The court said the due process guarantee of the Maine Constitution" protects the defendant from vindictiveness playing any part in resentencing.s Reaffirming its prior
adoption of the Pearce rule in Weeks, the Law Court stated:
The rule, easy of application, effectively safeguards a successful appellant upon retrial from the possibility, however slight, of retaliatory vindictiveness following reconviction, and protects a convicted
defendant's right to an appeal from any chilling effect emanating
from the possibility that an enhanced second sentence might result
from a retrial on the same facts.0
Significantly, the Law Court did not base its decision in Violette on
86. Id. at 10.
87. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
88. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
89. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
90. 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
91. 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
92. For discussion and analysis of the Maine Constitution's due process guarantee
and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's shift toward addressing issues under the
state constitution before reaching a federal constitutional question, see Comment,
The Primacy Method of State Constitutional Decisionmaking: Interpreting the
Maine Constitution, 38 MmNE L Rsv. 491 (1986). The primacy method involves a

state court first examining any state constitutional issue raised by a litigant. Only if
the litigant's claims fail under the state constitution will the state court examine the
claims under the federal Constitution. The advantages of the primacy method are to
give "clear direction to the bench and bar as to how state constitutional law claims
are to be addressed" and to create "a primary and active role" for the state constitution. Id. at 495-97.
93. 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984).

94. See supra note 4.
95. State v. Violette, 576 A.2d at 1360.
96. Id. at 1361.
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the likelihood that vindictiveness was a factor in the harsher resentencing. Rather, the court indicated that discrepancy in sentences
that are "inherently likely to occur when two different judges engage
in sentencing
on the same sentencing facts" should not be
7
9

tolerated.

Justice Collins, in a lone dissent, maintained that the presumption of vindictiveness triggering the Weeks rule was unwarranted
when the resentencing judge was unaware of the previous sentence.9 8
Even if the presumption of vindictiveness were applicable, the presumption should be rebutted by the judge's reliance on objective evidence. According to Justice Collins, it should not matter whether
the evidence relates to the defendant's conduct before or after the
initial sentencing. 9 "[Tihe interests of justice would be better
served" by the "less formalistic approach," 00 thus embracing the
Supreme Court's focus on the likelihood of vindictiveness and the
allowance of "objective evidence to rebut the Pearce presumption,"
even when it does not involve the defendant's conduct since the initial sentencing and even when the first judge had the same
evidence. 1' 1
DISCUSSION

The procedural setting of Violette puts the case in a gray area not
addressed in the Supreme Court's rulings since Pearce. The argument for allowing harsher resentencing is strongest when the defendant has committed a crime since the initial sentencing. The argument is weakest when the resentencing judge knows the initial
sentence and does not base the harsher sentence on some objective
information beyond that which the initial sentencing judge possessed in the same court. Violette falls in the middle. In Violette,
the judge resentenced the defendant more harshly without knowing
the initial sentence imposed by a judge in the same court. No case
before the Supreme Court has presented exactly this situation for
applying Pearce.
Nevertheless, the Law Court, in examining the Supreme Court's
applications of the Pearce rule, could have found support for concluding that the harsher resentence in Violette did not violate state
or federal due process and could have refined the Weeks rule accordingly. As far back as Colten,02 a case followed by the Law Court
in Keegan,10 3 the Supreme Court has engaged in a weighing of the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 1363 (Collins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1364 (Collins, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
State v. Keegan, 296 A.2d 483 (Me. 1972).
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likelihood of vindictiveness as the determinative factor in whether
to apply the Pearce presumption. The Law Court could have seized
upon the facts that two sentencers were involved, as in McCullough,' 4 and that the sentencer unknowingly gave a harsher punishment at resentencing than was given after the original conviction, as
in Chaffin,10 5 to find insufficient likelihood of vindictiveness to justify a presumption of vindictiveness.100
The Law Court may have had a motivation distinct from the federal system for not retreating from the strictness and breadth of the
Weeks rule. The context in which Violette was decided and the language in which the Law Court couched its decision suggest that consistency in judicial sentencing was an underlying driving force. In
addition, Violette was an ideal case for requiring sentencing
consistency.
Violette was decided in a new era of review of sentencing for consistency. The Maine Legislature in 1989, following a call for reforms
in Maine's appellate review process of sentencing,' 07 revised the procedure for the reviewing of the propriety of sentences by providing
for a discretionary appeal of sentences to the Supreme Judicial
Court.108 In doing so, the Legislature restricted the ability of the reviewers to increase sentences and established the potential for developing a common law body of sentencing guidelines.'" The development of some common law guidelines from published opinions of
the court was advocated as an alternative to legislatively adopting
104.

Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986). The Supreme Court said the pre-

sumption of vindictiveness is "inapplicable because different sentencers assessed the
varying sentences that McCullough received. In such circumstances, a sentence 'increase' cannot truly be said to have taken place." Id. at 140.
105. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1977). The Supreme Court said, without equivocation, "[T]he first prerequisite for the imposition of a retaliatory penalty
is knowledge of the prior sentence." Id. at 26.
106. Although McCullough involved a judge resentencing more harshly than a
jury and Chaffin involved sentencing by two juries, several state courts have relied
upon McCullough and Chaffin to reach a conclusion opposite to the Law Court's finding in Violette. See, e.g., State v. Macomber, 244 Kan. 396, 769 P.2d 621 (1989) and
State v. Saavedra, 108 N.M. 38, 766 P.2d 298 (1988). In both cases, it was found that
the presumption of vindictiveness was not created where a different judge imposed
the harsher sentence on resentencing.
107. Wathen, Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A
Proposalfor Enhanced Appellate Review, 40

NMNE

L Rav. 1 (1988).

108. Leave to appeal a sentence is granted by a sentence review panel composed
of three Supreme Judicial Court justices. Leave to appeal is granted if any of the
three panelists vote in favor of granting leave. Ma. Rav. STAT. ANNt tit. 15, § 2152
(Supp. 1990).

The standard the court applies in reviewing sentences is whether there has been a
"misapplication of principle. It is not enough that the members of this court might
have passed a different sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err in
principle that we will alter it." State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778. 781 (Me. 1990).
109. See supra note 82.
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sentencing guidelines, as Congress has done. 110 The process of appeal to the full court replaced a system of appeal to an appellate
division of the court composed of three justices."' The result in Violette of a consistent sentence thus conforms with a legislative and a
judicial movement toward sentencing consistency, even though the
issue in Violette was the legality of the sentencing and not the propriety of the sentencing. 1 2 The legality of the sentence pertains to
rights, such as due process, whereas the propriety pertains to proportionality of the sentence to the crime.
The Law Court clothed the Violette decision in the language of
sentencing consistency. The court first noted that the Weeks rule
prevents inherent sentencing disparities and subsequently referred
to the Weeks rule's ease of application and its effectiveness." 8 The
Law Court, while not finding Violette "an appropriate occasion for
departing from our Weeks rule," specifically asserted its prerogative
to reexamine Weeks "in light of later federal developments in the
Pearce rule."" 4 One implication is that the Law Court did not commit to a rigid application of the Weeks rule in the future but may
have found the rule convenient for sentencing consistency in this
case.
The facts of Violette are conducive with sentencing consistency as
an underlying motivation. The crime was the same, the offender and
his character were the same, and the public interest presumably was
the same in both the initial conviction and the reconviction. Both
sentencers in Violette had the same significant information.' 1" The
underlying justification for both sentences was exactly the same,
which eliminates a great obstacle in achieving sentencing consistency." 8 Indeed it would appear that the most significant variables
110. The concern in Maine parallels a national trend toward consistency in sentencing. However, the federal approach toward sentencing consistency has been Congressional passage of sentencing guidelines developed by the United States Sentencing Commission. For a concise history of the development of federal sentencing
guidelines, see Ogletree, supra note 24, at 1938.
111. Wathen, supra note 107, at 8-13.
112. See State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 888-89 (Me. 1984).
113. State v. Violette, 576 A.2d at 1359, 1361.
114. Id. at 1360.
115. Record (Feb. 5, 1988), State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No. 8718834, 87-18835, 87-18769); Record (May 19, 1989), State v. Violette, 576 A.2d 1359
(Me. 1990) (No. 87-18834).
116. Factors taken into account by the Supreme Judicial Court in its review of the
propriety of sentences are specified by statute Factors to be considered by Supreme
Judicial Court, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2155 (Supp. 1990), are:
1. Propriety of sentence. The propriety of the sentence, having regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest; and
2. Manner in which sentence was imposed. The manner in which the
sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based.
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at the two sentencings were the values and the sentencing philosophy the sentencers brought to the case, factors not providing a justification for wide sentencing discrepancy under the Law Court's review. 117 Therefore, it was entirely appropriate that the court's
decision resulted in a consistent sentence.
The degree to which sentencing consistency was the motivator of
the Law Court's decision in Violette may indicate the future shape
of the Weeks rule. While the Weeks rule and the goal of sentencing
consistency were compatible in Violette, they are likely to conflict at
some point. For example, if new information was to come to light
after the first sentence about the defendant's role in the crime,
about the severity of the crime, or about the defendant's prior criminal record, the Weeks rule as characterized to date would seem to
prohibit harsher resentencing. However, harsher resentencing in
these examples would be favored in a system that truly achieves
sentencing consistency. 118 If sentencing consistency was the prime
reason for the Violette decision, the Law Court will be tempted to
soften the Weeks rule and adopt a more expansive view of what con-

stitutes identifiable misconduct.11 9 Violette then would prove to be a

narrow decision that does not presume a state due process protection significantly broader than federal due process under Pearce.
Violette, then, can be explained in one of two ways. Either the
Variables within each of the three considerations in weighing propriety of sentence
usually are individualistic to the case and subjectively measured. See Wathen. supra
note 107, at 7.
Sentencing factors taken into account in Maine include the gravity of the offense;
its relation to the victim; the defendant's degree of culpability;, the defendant's background, including his criminal record and any undesirable behavior pattern; the defendant's character, including his personality and social traits, age, education, employment record, remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant's
subjectivity to rehabilitation; the public interest in retribution and deterrence; and
the public's right to protection against crime. State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60, 67-68
(Me. 1978).
However, where, as in Violette, the defendant is the same person in the two
sentences being compared, and where there is not misconduct by the defendant since
the prior sentencing, these factors are likely to be constants.
The defendant's criminal record was different at the two sentencings, but it was
more damning at the initial sentencing. The initial sentencing included a conviction
for operating a vehicle after suspension. Record at 46 (Feb. 5. 1988). State v. Violette,
576 A.2d 1359 (Me. 1990) (No. 87-18834, 87-18835, 87-18769). The defendant also was
convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 47. The conviction for operating
after suspension was overturned on appeal and the charge dropped prior to the defendant's reconviction for GUI and his resentencing. Telephone interview with
Thomas Van Houten, attorney for defendant (Nov. 13, 1990).
117. M. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2155 (Supp. 1990). Justice Wathen cites several examples in which variations or undue emphasis in judicial philosophy was responsible for inappropriate sentences. Wathen, supra note 107, at 16-17.
118. See supra note 116. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(d) (West Supp. 1990).
119. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984). See also Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
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Law Court wanted to wait until the Supreme Court decides a procedurally similar case, serving the goal of sentencing consistency in the
narrowness of a Violette-like case. Or the Law Court was sincerely
disturbed about the due process implications 2" and took this occasion to depart from the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
Pearce rule.
The Law Court's language in Violette could be read as having significantly distinguished the Weeks rule from the reinterpreted
Pearce rule. The Law Court showed a much greater concern in Violette than has the Supreme Court for the chilling effect that possibly harsher resentencing creates on defendants' exercise of their
right to appeal. 2 " Although the Law Court was clear that it did not
believe there was vindictiveness in the case at hand, 22 it emphasized
the Weeks rule's value in safeguarding against even the possibility
of vindictiveness, "however slight."12 3 The Law Court also praised

the Weeks rule for its ease of application.124 In adhering to a rigid
rule formally applied, the Law Court avoided the mire of weighing
the justifications for applying or denying the presumption of vindictiveness, a problem that is likely to persist for the federal courts.
While the Pearce rule has its problems, developing Weeks separately from the Pearce model poses difficulties as well. The Law
Court in future cases may be asked to define identifiable misconduct
in a manner which broadens the grounds for rebutting the presumption of vindictiveness,' 25 to narrow the circumstances in which the
presumption applies,'" to decide if Weeks bears on resentencing after a withdrawn guilty plea, 1 7 and even to assess whether lack of
remorse could be a basis for a harsher resentence. Violette does not
resolve these questions.
The Law Court in Weeks, in adopting the rule from Pearce, implied that identifiable misconduct or recidivism constituted continu120.
121.

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 143. "[T]his Court has never recog-

nized this 'chilling effect' as sufficient reason to create a constitutional prohibition
against considering relevant information in assessing sentences." Id.
However, the chilling effect of harsher resentencing by a judge who does not know
the initial sentence is conceivable. A defendant contemplating an appeal obviously
would have no way to predict, should he win an appeal and be reconvicted, whether a
judge would elect to be uninformed of the prior sentence so as to exercise the full
latitude of his sentencing discretion. Also, a judge who harbored a vindictiveness toward the defendant simply could remain uninformed for the purpose of sentencing
harshly.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

State v. Violette, 576 A.2d
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 34-38 and
See supra notes 39-45 and
See supra notes 46-49 and

at 1361.

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
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ing "criminal activities. ' 12 That definition and the Law Court's emphasis on the chilling effect of harsher resentencing suggest that the
Law Court could follow a different path than the Supreme Court
chose in Wasman, 29 which broadened the basis for rebutting the
presumption of vindictiveness. In allowing a conviction occurring after the initial sentencing to justify a harsher sentence, the Wasman
Court allowed an event to rebut the Pearce presumption.13 0 However, the Law Court has yet to expand on what it means by identifiable misconduct or recidivism. So long as the Law Court defines
identifiable misconduct or recidivism narrowly, the defendant's conduct since the prior sentencing is arguably the element that is the
most controllable by the defendant and therefore theoretically
should have the least chilling effect on the defendant's decision
whether to appeal.
If the Law Court is to focus on the chilling effect of harsher resentencing, then the Law Court might favor wider borders for the presumption than the Supreme Court allowed in McCullough.13 New
information on the crime, on the defendant's involvement in the
crime, or on the defendant's background should be disregarded in
the resentencing if chilling is to be avoided. As Justice Marshall so
vigorously cautioned in his dissent in McCullough,13 2 a judge inevitably will be able to find new information in a trial on which to base
a harsher sentence should he desire. Consequently, to allow that new
information unrelated to conduct since the initial sentencing to
serve as grounds for avoiding a presumption of vindictiveness always
allows a judge to avoid the Pearce presumption while resentencing
more harshly. 3 ' The Violette decision does not address this point
directly because there was no information that the second judge had
that the first judge did not have.
Applying a Weeks presumption when the resentencing judge has
new information would be the most problematic use of Weeks by
the Law Court. The rule in Weeks that a resentencing judge may
only consider identifiable misconduct since the last sentence as a ba128. Weeks v. State, 267 A.2d 641, 647 (Me. 1970).
129. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
130. Id. at 571-72.
131. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986). The Supreme Court did not apply
the Pearce presumption and allowed a harsher resentence because the possibility of
vindictiveness was speculative, different sentencers were involved, and the resentencing judge provided a logical, nonvindictive reason for the harsher sentence. Id. at 139-

40.
132. Id. at 154 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

133. Justice Marshall's dissent says:
The Court then reaches out to render the guarantee of little value to all
defendants, even to those whose plight was the explicit concern of the
Pearce Court in 1969. To renege on the guarantee of Pearce is wrong. To do
so while pretending not to is a shame.

Id. at 156.
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sis for imposing a harsher sentence conflicts with the public interest
identified in Weeks of "assess[ing] a sentence, whether after a first
or second trial, upon the most complete and current information
available at the time of sentencing, including in the case of resentence new factual data involving conduct of the defendant which
arose since the first sentence."'1 3' This conflict between the Weeks
rule and the interest in assessing the sentence upon the most complete and available information is a significant weakness of the
Weeks rule. 35
The hypothetical that evidently influenced the Supreme Court in
McCullough"' illustrates the problem. The defendant is sentenced
to a short prison term after a conviction on a nonviolent offense.
Following a successful appeal and a reconviction, the resentencing
judge learns that the defendant's alias had hidden a long criminal
record for other nonviolent and violent crimes. Under a Weeks rule
that rigidly applied a presumption of vindictiveness barring a harsher sentence absent misconduct, the Maine courts would not be
able to take into account the defendant's newly discovered criminal
record.
If Violette represents a departure from Pearce, the Law Court
may be asked whether Weeks applies to resentencing in cases when
the defendant has successfully withdrawn a guilty plea on appeal.
Defendants in this situation are a possible target for judicial vindictiveness upon a reconviction. 13 The Supreme Court in Alabama v.
Smith,138 however, concluded that harsher sentences for defendants
who have withdrawn from guilty pleas should not be attributed to
vindictiveness.
After withdrawing from two guilty pleas which resulted in concurrent thirty-year sentences for burglary and rape, Smith was found
guilty by a jury on both charges and on a sodomy charge. He was
resentenced by the same judge to life imprisonment for burglary, life
imprisonment for sodomy, and a consecutive term of 150 years for
rape. The Supreme Court, noting that the judge learned new information about the nature of the crimes and their impact on the victim together with the defendant's mental outlook on the crimes, said
134. Weeks v. State, 267 A.2d at 647.
135. Justice Collins, in his dissent, noted that there was no dispute in Violette
that the number of convictions and the flight from an arresting officer would normally be appropriate factors to consider in sentencing for operating under the influence. State v. Violette, 576 A.2d at 1363. However, this information was known at the
defendant's first sentencing. Under the Weeks rule, this information could not overcome the presumption of vindictiveness even if it had not been known at the first
sentencing.
136. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 141 (1986).
137. For a discussion of guilty pleas, see Aplin, Sentence Increases on Retrial
After North Carolinav.Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427, 462-64 (1970).
138. 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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the resentencing judge's fuller appreciation of the case is sufficient
justification for a harsher sentence.1 30
The rationale for not applying a Pearce presumption in this circumstance derives partly from the Supreme Court's decision in
Brady v. United States' 0 justifying the use of plea bargaining. The
Court, in a decision otherwise unrelated to Pearce, said that while
the attraction of a lesser sentence from plea bargaining may discourage defendants from the exercise of their trial rights, the imposition
of such choices is inherent in any system that tolerates the negotiation of pleas. Therefore, the fear instilled in the defendant of a potentially harsher penalty if he chooses a trial is not coercion in violation of the fifth amendment right against compelled selfincrimination."' The degree of leniency simply is not offered or is
withdrawn when the defendant puts the state to the effort of a trial.
An alternate approach to Smith is to view the Weeks rule as categorically applicable only to instances when the defendant has had
two trials. The distinction avoids justifying the increased sentence
on the basis of new information garnered in the second trial related
to conduct preceding the first sentencing. Justifying the harsher resentence on new information creates more opportunities for erosion
of the Weeks rule than does making a more basic delineation, similar to Brady, that plea bargaining is a waiver of the trial and the
1 42
protections it affords.
Of course, defendants who have withdrawn plea bargains still
would be left relatively unprotected from actual vindictiveness at
the resentencing. The defendant would have the burden of proving
that the harsher sentence was vindictive, exactly the burden that
the Weeks rule was intended to remove. In practical terms, however,
for the plea bargaining system to function, the court cannot be
bound by the prior sentence that was a product of the bargain.
Remorse, or the lack of it, presents another potential dilemma in
resentencing under the Weeks restriction. The degree of remorse,
repentance, or cooperativeness is an accepted factor in sentencing in
Maine. 143 On a request for leniency, a defendant's exercise of the
right of trial can be weighed by the sentencing judge in Maine as
one of many factors in testing the genuineness of the defendant's
139. Id. at 801. The Supreme Court recognized that Smith was inconsistent with
Simpson v. Rice, the companion case of Pearce, but attributed the change in view to
"important developments in the constitutional law of guilty pleas." Id. at 802.
140. 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping to avoid
the possibility of a death penalty).
141. Id. See also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (defendant
pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
(defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder).
142. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748.
143. State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60, 67-68 (Me. 1978).
I
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remorse.144 However, suppose a defendant's request for leniency is
warmly received at the first sentencing. Then the defendant successfully appeals and is reconvicted before the same judge. At the resentencing, the judge detects significantly less remorse. Should the
judge be precluded from sentencing more harshly?
Lack of remorse clearly plays a role in the public interest in sentencing, and leniency could be a commodity equally withdrawable
here as after a withdrawn guilty plea. Applying the Weeks rule, the
issue becomes whether a perceived diminution in the defendant's remorse, in the extreme, could constitute identifiable misconduct.
If lack of remorse can justify harsher sentencing, a concern about
possible vindictiveness and its chilling effect should require that the
judge's determination of diminished remorse be based on some objective fact, which fairly resembles plain misconduct. Otherwise, determining the degree of remorse is inherently subjective, and allowing lack of remorse as a justification guts the Weeks rule,
presenting the same dilemma which Justice Marshall raised in his
dissent in McCullough"5 that a judge could hide vindictiveness
under such a cover.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Pearce created a presumption of vindictiveness regulating harsher resentencing of defendants who successfully appealed a conviction and were reconvicted. The Law Court
adopted the Pearcerule in Weeks and described the rule in terms of
barring harsher resentencing unless there was identifiable misconduct since the initial sentencing. While the Supreme Court has since
narrowed the application of the presumption and broadened the
grounds for rebutting it, Maine has had few opportunities to readdress the rule. Violette presented one of the rare opportunities, and
the Law Court declined to delve into the federal revisions. To the
extent that the Law Court in Violette declined to weigh the likelihood of vindictiveness and emphasized the chilling effect of even a
slight possibility of vindictiveness, the Law Court appears to distinguish the rule of Weeks from its federal mold, Pearce.
The decision in Violette, whatever its significance, may have been
driven in part by an underlying concern for consistency in sentencing. On the principle of consistency, the resentencing of a defendant
144. State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887 (Me. 1984). In Farnham the court found that
the assessment of the genuineness of a defendant's remorse for purposes of sentencing may include among the factors the defendant's insistence on a trial. Id. at 891.
The dissent, however, pointed out that this would result in the accused being penalized for exercising his constitutional right to trial. Id. at 895 (Glassman, J.,
dissenting).
145. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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after a successful appeal and reconviction should not justify a harsher sentence unless there is new information or misconduct since
the prior sentence. However, consistency in sentencing may sometimes conflict with the due process rule of Weeks, if Weeks is applied so as to preclude harsher sentencing unless there is misconduct
since the initial sentence. Consequently, the degree to which the
Law Court viewed Violette as an issue of consistency in sentencing
portends future tensions for the Weeks rule.
The Law Court found the simplicity and effectiveness of an unrevised Weeks rule attractive. Indeed, by declining to measure the
likelihood of vindictiveness, the Law Court avoided a mire that has
engaged the Supreme Court. However, a Weeks rule that departs
from the revised Pearce rule will require the Law Court to apply
different standards for state due process than the Supreme Court
has provided in its application of Pearce.
Notably, a reasonable question remains whether a harsher sentence can be imposed in resentencing in any circumstances absent
identifiable misconduct by the defendant. Although the Law Court
reached for simplicity, the Weeks rule requires further testing.
Thomas C. Bradley

